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Abstract 
Michael Ridge defends Capacity Judgment Internalism (CJI): simply qua their particular 
character and content, first person normative judgments are necessarily capable of 
motivating without the help of any independent desire. I examine and rebut Ridge’s two 
arguments for CJI. First, he rejects as incoherent the possibility of anormativists: agents 
whose first person normative judgments are not capable of motivating them. I argue that 
anormativists can exist and be intelligible as agents even if normative judgments do not move 
them. Second, he argues for CJI from Rational Judgment Internalism (RJI), which rationally 
requires to intend to do as one judges that one ought to do. In order for RJI to apply and for 
violations of RJI to be blameable, we need to suppose that making the judgment that I ought 
to F already ensures that I am able to intend to F, and CJI is the view of normative judgment 
which  guarantees that. I argue that Ridge’s argument relies on an unlikely picture of 
normative requirements and in any case makes RJI an odd requirement. I conclude by 
showing how externalism can accommodate RJI.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his Impassioned Belief (2014), Michael Ridge argues for what he calls Capacity Judgment 
Internalism, which he formulates thus:  
 
simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative judgments are 
necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any independent desire. Call this 
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doctrine “Capacity Judgment Internalism,” or “CJI” for short. CJI is a necessary truth about 
the nature of normative judgment. (51)
1
 
 
The sort of normative judgment to which CJI applies is first-personal and all things 
considered. It is a judgment to the effect that one ought to do something oneself, where all or 
at least enough of the relevant reasons speak strongly in favour of doing it (48). The relevant 
reasons might be moral as well as prudential or of other kinds. In this sense CJI is different 
from familiar forms of internalism about moral judgment, whereby first-personal moral 
judgment necessarily motivates, at least to some extent (without the help of any independent 
desire). The focus of CJI is all things considered generic ought judgment, where the ought 
need not be moral. For this reason, some counterexamples to moral judgment internalism do 
not apply to CJI. The so-called amoralist, who seems to judge that e.g. he morally ought to 
keep a promise but is not in the least motivated to do it, is perfectly conceivable for CJI, since 
his judgment is not an all things considered generic ought judgment. Perhaps he thinks that 
though all moral reasons speak in favour of his keeping the promise, it is not the case that he 
all things considered ought to do it. Maybe there are strong prudential reasons that speak 
against keeping the promise, or maybe the moral reasons are not weighty enough for him to 
arrive at an overall normative judgment.  
 
There is a second important difference from traditional internalism as well. CJI only requires 
that first-personal normative judgments be capable of motivating, as opposed to actually 
motivating the subject. Thus, even if our amoralist were to make the normative judgment that 
all things considered he ought to keep the promise, his failure to be motivated accordingly is 
compatible with CJI, as long as his judgment still has the capacity to motivate him. The 
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proper counterexample to CJI must rather present us with a case of a genuine all things 
considered normative judgment that is not even capable of motivating the subject. Ridge calls 
such a subject the “anormativist” (56-57). 
 
In what follows I examine and rebut Ridge’s two arguments for CJI: the rejection of the 
possibility of anormativism (sec. 2), and an argument from the rational requirement to intend 
to do as one judges that one ought to do (sec. 3). I will conclude with a few remarks about the 
nature of this requirement and about verdicts of akrasia (sec. 4). 
 
2. Ridge’s first argument for CJI 
 
Is the anormativist a coherent counterexample to CJI? Not so for Ridge:  
 
we are left with a character who is supposed to be deeply indifferent to, and indeed utterly 
incapable of being moved by, considerations which by his lights do provide perfectly good 
reasons for action. This is not obviously coherent. (57) 
 
While Ridge does not place much weight on this argument, it does follow from CJI that the 
anormativist cannot exist. So any rejection of CJI would entail that anormativism is possible 
and coherent. I believe two considerations are necessary to establish this possibility.  
 
First, Ridge might have been supposing that the anormativist, unlike the amoralist, is not a 
coherent possibility for agency, because the anormativist’s actions would never be guided by 
his normative judgments, whereas the amoralist “is still capable of caring about those 
considerations which he takes to be genuinely normative” (57), such as the ruthless pursuit of 
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his own welfare. However, if this is the reason why the anormativist is thought to be 
impossible, it depends on a questionable view of agency: acting for reasons is essentially a 
matter of acting on the basis of one’s normative judgments. This view can be resisted. It 
seems that one can still act for reasons in being guided by desires, where desires may include 
what one may call a non-doxastic apprehension of reasons.
2
 For instance, the immediate 
allure of a tasty meal at my favourite restaurant might motivate me, regardless of any 
contrary judgment to the effect that ‘all things considered I ought to do something else’. In 
acting both against an opposing normative judgment and without a supporting normative 
judgment, the anormativist would still be acting for a reason. It seems that only an overly 
intellectualized account of acting for a reason would demand in each case a normative 
judgment on the agent’s part.  
 
Ridge might reply that, even if acting for reasons is not always a matter of being motivated 
by normative judgments, it does still demand that at least sometimes we are motivated by 
them—or at least that we are capable of being so motivated. Nobody can be an anormativist 
all the time. However—and this is the second consideration—rejecting CJI does not require 
the possibility of global anormativism. All it requires is the possibility that a certain genuine 
normative judgment is never capable of motivating the subject. For example, we might 
imagine someone who believes that (e.g.) God’s commandments are always decisive—
wherever they apply, he judges that he all things considered ought to follow God’s 
commandments—and yet is systematically unmoved by this judgment. It would seem 
plausible to hold that this all things considered normative judgment is not capable of 
motivating him, and so we have a counterexample to CJI. 
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Ridge may reply in two ways. First, he may insist that being systematically unmoved by a 
certain normative judgment does not imply that its capacity to motivate does not exist—the 
capacity might simply be blocked by some recurring but contingent psychological factor. 
While I agree that a capacity to motivate may remain systematically unexpressed, I believe 
that the burden lies on Ridge to specify in greater detail when a capacity to motivate is 
present and when not, since this is after all the key concept in his CJI. Pending that, all one 
can say is that if in a sufficiently wide range of nearby possible worlds the subject is not 
motivated, to any extent, by his normative judgment, then we have little reason to think that 
that judgment has the capacity to motivate him (compare: if in a sufficiently wide range of 
circumstances you do not tell red from green objects, then one is justified in thinking you 
lack the capacity to tell red from green objects).
3
 
 
Second, Ridge may reply that, as long as other normative judgments are capable of 
motivating the subject (and presumably do motivate him often enough), this is no 
counterexample to CJI. What CJI deems necessary is the subject’s being able to be motivated 
by normative judgments, rather than any motivating power had by any particular normative 
judgment at any particular time. This reply, however, would violate the letter of CJI, which 
after all ascribes the motivational capacity to normative judgments and their ‘particular 
character and content’, and not to the agent.  
 
3. Ridge’s second argument for CJI 
 
Ridge’s second argument is based on what he calls 
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Rational Judgment Internalism (RJI): Necessarily, if an agent otherwise wholeheartedly 
makes the normative judgment that, all things considered, he must F in C, but does not intend 
to F in C, then he is thereby less than fully practically rational. (58)
4
 
 
RJI is a version of what in another context John Broome calls the requirement of ‘enkrasia’—
since to violate such a requirement would be a case of akrasia: failing to intend to do as one 
judges that one all things considered ought to do.
5
 RJI prescribes a norm or ideal of 
rationality, and as such an agent who fails to meet RJI is to that extent criticizable as less than 
fully practically rational. But for any such criticism to be fair or reasonable, it must be 
possible, for the agent judging that she ought to F in C, to intend to F in C. Ridge glosses this 
point as follows:  
 
Plausibly, making the judgment yet not intending accordingly is sufficient, absent some 
excuse, for blaming the agent. Insofar as we think this, though, to be reasonable we must 
implicitly also assume that the normative judgment guarantees at least a capacity to be 
motivated accordingly. (58) 
 
In this passage Ridge is making two claims:  
(1) The Sufficiency Claim: our blame towards the agent flouting RJI is always appropriate 
upon simply knowing that he makes the relevant judgment but does not intend 
accordingly—at least, absent ‘excuses’, i.e. (as I understand it) absent circumstances 
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which make the agent an inappropriate target of blame, although they do not cancel 
the applicability of RJI to him; 
  
(2) The Guarantee Claim: if (1) is true, then there must be something in merely making 
the relevant judgment which ensures that the agent can be blamed if he fails to meet 
RJI, or which at least ensures that RJI applies to him (when excuses defeat blame). 
But since the agent can be blamed only if in the relevant sense he is able to meet RJI, 
then something in merely making the relevant judgment must ensure that he is able to 
meet RJI.  
 
Now, CJI is ideally placed for explaining what this ‘something’ is: on CJI making the 
normative judgment entails the capacity to be motivated accordingly, and an agent who has 
the capacity to be so motivated is an agent who is able to meet RJI, and who can in turn be 
criticized for not meeting RJI.
6
 In other words, CJI is the view about all things considered 
normative judgment that guarantees that making such a judgment is sufficient (absent 
excuses) for blaming the agent who fails to intend accordingly. 
 
We can put Ridge’s argument in the form of a modus tollens: 
1. If CJI is false (normative judgment does not necessarily have the capacity to motivate), 
then it would not be reasonable to blame agents upon simply knowing that they fail to intend 
in accordance with the normative judgement they make.  
2. But (absent excuses) it is reasonable to blame agents upon simply knowing that they fail to 
intend in accordance with the normative judgement they make.  
3. Therefore CJI is true.  
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This is a genuinely novel argument in favour of CJI, one that holds the promise to break the 
stalemate between internalism and externalism created by conflicting intuitions about 
amoralists and, one would add, about anormativists too (that is probably why Ridge seems to 
place more emphasis on this second argument than on the first). However, it seems to me that 
premise 2 is highly dubious, once we see what it entails.  
 
I take it that for Ridge any given verdict of irrationality (and associated blame, if applicable) 
is exhaustively explained by the combined fact that the agent made the relevant normative 
judgment and did not intend accordingly. What is crucial to Ridge’s argument is that, at least 
in these cases, we would not need to mention a further fact: that the agent was able to intend 
accordingly. This fact about the agent’s ability is supposed to be already ‘packed into’ the 
combined fact, and in particular, into the fact that the agent made the relevant normative 
judgment. As said above, simply making the normative judgment ensures that the agent is 
able to intend accordingly. 
 
However this is a questionable move, for the following reason. This is not how typically 
‘ought’-facts and in general normative requirements (such as the requirement to follow RJI) 
imply ‘can’-facts. Consider now a moral requirement. I make a promise (at t1) to meet you at 
t2, and at t2 I fail to keep the promise. Am I to blame just upon knowing that I made a 
promise and didn’t keep it? It seems that one extra thing to know about me is whether at t2 I 
am able to keep the promise. We cannot read off this extra fact simply from the fact that I 
promised, even if the promise was sincere (perhaps, in promising, I thought I would be able 
to keep it, but then the world turned against me). Also, surely we do not want to say that a 
certain act did not count as promising (at t1) if (at t2) it is not the case that the promise can be 
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kept. This example points to a general lesson, which we can put in the helpful terminology of 
favourers and enablers (Dancy 2004). Wherever there is a normative requirement, different 
features play different roles in explaining or ‘structuring’ that requirement. The fact that I 
made the promise favours my keeping it. The fact that I am able to keep the promise enables 
the former fact to favour my keeping it: if I were not able to keep it, the fact that I made the 
promise would not favour keeping it. If the favourer is enabled to do its favouring job, then 
we have a normative requirement (or at least a pro tanto reason) to keep the promise. Once 
this division of explanatory labour is on the table, it is highly unlikely that one and the same 
fact can both favour a certain action and enable itself to do the favouring. It is not downright 
impossible: for example, it may be true that, after a period of forced immobility, the mere fact 
that I can move my leg is a reason to move it (the possibility to finally use my leg favours the 
action) and also works as an enabler, since after all I only have a reason to move my leg if it 
is true that I can move it. But as the promise example shows, favourers and enablers do not 
normally overlap, nor can one read off enablers from favourers. 
 
So what is suspect in premise 2 of Ridge’s argument is the peculiar structure that he assigns 
to RJI. What favours my intention to F—my making the judgment that I ought to F—would 
have to include within itself what enables it to favour the intention—the fact that, in simply 
making the judgment, I am thereby made able to intend accordingly. In short, Ridge needs to 
conflate favourers and enablers for his argument to work, and this contrasts with the way 
normative requirements are typically structured. 
 
Ridge might contest this objection in two ways. First, I have assumed that the structure of the 
rational requirement RJI can be modelled on the example of a moral requirement to keep a 
promise, where favourer and enabler are sharply distinguished. Ridge might reply: ‘why 
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assume that making a normative judgment plays vis-à-vis intending accordingly exactly the 
same role as making a promise plays vis-à-vis keeping the promise?’ After all, it is not as if 
the structure of rational requirements such as RJI (and the like, for instance those governing 
belief or means-end reasoning) is uncontroversial. There is debate, for instance, on whether 
they are better understood as narrow- or wide-scope requirements. On the narrow-scope 
view, RJI has this form:  
 
pRq,  
 
where p stands for ‘A judges that he ought to F’, R for ‘it is required that’, and q for ‘A 
intends to F’. On the wide-scope view, RJI looks like this:  
 
R(pq),  
 
i.e. it is required that, if A judges that he ought to F, then A intends to F.
7
 Part of the 
difference is that, if read narrow-scope, the requirement is only satisfied by intending to F, 
whereas the wide-scope requirement may be satisfied either by intending to F or by retracting 
the normative judgment. The wide-scope view seems better to capture the nature of such 
requirements as promoting coherence among our attitudes—in this case, by avoiding 
akrasia—and akrasia can be avoided either by intending to F or by giving up the normative 
judgment. If we adopt the wide-scope view, Ridge might argue, making the normative 
judgment cannot be said to simply favour the corresponding intention, because what is 
favoured is really a state of coherence rather than a determinate attitude. By contrast, once we 
make a promise, what is favoured is the keeping of the promise, nor can we somehow make 
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things right by ‘unmaking’ the promise in the way we can avoid akrasia by retracting our 
normative judgment. All this suggests that moral requirements may not be the best model to 
understand RJI. 
 
However, this reply would be a double-edged sword. On the one hand the wide-scope view 
does something to question the immediate applicability of the favouring/enabling model to 
RJI. But on the other hand it implies that being able to satisfy RJI (hence being liable to 
blame) cannot simply be a matter of making the normative judgment. On the wide-scope 
view, the agent to whom RJI applies must be able to achieve coherence among her mental 
states: having made the judgment that she ought to F, she must be able to (intend to F or 
retract the normative judgment). Suppose now that, though having made the judgment, she is 
unable to intend to F. (This possibility does not beg the question against Ridge, since RJI is 
now understood as wide-scope, and therefore being rational by RJI’s lights need not uniquely 
consist in forming the intention to F.) In order for the agent to be able to satisfy RJI, only one 
option is left: she needs to be able to retract the normative judgment. But this ability—
following the logic of Ridge’s argument—should be ensured by the very making of the 
judgment.
8
 And this is far from obvious. It seems that the kind of capacity and opportunity 
needed for her to be able to retract the judgment can hardly be guaranteed by the mere fact 
that she made that very judgment.
9
 Indeed, when one is not going to intend to F, the judgment 
that one ought to F is precisely the problem to solve, the obstacle to one’s coherence, and 
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therefore it cannot itself ensure the ability to retract it. So, arguably, adopting a wide-scope 
view of RJI makes things more complicated for Ridge’s argument. 
 
Secondly, Ridge might reject the analogy between RJI and the requirement to keep promises, 
by drawing a line between the ability to form an intention and the ability to perform a 
promised action. Having the latter ability is partly a matter of the external world cooperating 
with me (I might have an unforeseeable accident on my way to our agreed meeting), whereas 
having the former ability may be thought to be a mostly internal, psychological matter. Ridge 
would thus be justified in assuming that normative judgments ‘bring along’ an ability to form 
corresponding intentions (or else they are not genuine normative judgments), in a way that 
promising normally should not be assumed to bring along the ability to keep the promise.
10
 
  
However, a distinction between internal and external abilities cannot do the work required by 
Ridge’s argument. What Ridge needs is not simply a requirement which otherwise rational 
agents are usually in a position to meet without the cooperation of the external world. His 
claim is rather that judging that one ought to F ensures that one is able to intend to F. RJI, as 
glossed by Ridge, would be a requirement that can never fail to apply because of the 
subject’s inability to meet it. Otherwise said, there is no possible world where I make the 
relevant normative judgment and I am unable to intend accordingly. (It is telling that the only 
qualification Ridge includes are ‘excuses’: once you make the relevant judgment, you may 
still be excused for not intending to F, but an excuse does not cancel a requirement or 
overturn a verdict of irrationality. An excuse only shelters you from blame.) The mere fact 
that the relevant ability is internal or psychological cannot guarantee that much, although it 
may mean that RJI is not as vulnerable as requirements to perform actions. In other words, it 
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seems that Ridge needs first to defend the special modal status of RJI (and perhaps of all 
rational requirements as a category), and only afterwards can he make claims about what sort 
of abilities are needed in order to support such modally special requirements.  
 
Moreover, it is not as if abilities that are internal or psychological must for that reason come 
as one package, as they would need to do on Ridge’s account. The question whether my 
ability to form the right intention stands and falls with my ability to make normative 
judgments cannot be answered positively just by noting that both are ‘internal’ capacities.  
 
4. Where does this leave us? 
 
If we reject premise 2 of Ridge’s argument, we remove the central motivation for CJI. But 
what to make of RJI? If what said above is on the right track, RJI must be understood in a 
non-Ridgean way: whether a given agent judging that she ought to F is able to intend to F 
must remain an open question rather than a question closed a priori by an internalist theory of 
normative judgment. Compare, once more, promises: how implausible it is to hold that the 
question whether I am able at t2 to keep the promise I made at t1 can be solved once and for 
all by a theory of what it is to make a promise. Since the agent might not be able to intend to 
F even after her judging that she ought to F, we would want our theory of normative 
judgment to keep that possibility open. Ridge seems to believe that we need to close off that 
possibility: 
 
If, however, a normative judgment of the relevant kind were not necessarily capable of 
motivating an agent to act accordingly, then the agent might simply be incapable of rationally 
acting in accordance with his judgment. (58) 
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But (absent a special story about rational requirements) it is not clear why being at least 
occasionally incapable of rationally acting in accordance with one’s judgment should be a 
problem. Perhaps Ridge is worried that, unless CJI is true, we could have a world where 
people make normative judgments but nobody is even capable of avoiding akrasia. And that 
might seem weird. But opponents of CJI—say, externalists—need not find anything weird 
with that possibility: it is simply a world, presumably very distant from ours, where 
requirements of enkrasia do not apply, because people’s normative judgments happen to not 
line up with their motivation in a way that makes them capable of intending accordingly. We 
are back, it seems, to the stalemate over conflicting intuitions that Ridge wanted to avoid.  
 
For the externalist, the question of whether a normative judgment motivates remains open, 
and so does the question of whether the person can intend accordingly. But, Ridge might 
finally reply, don’t we still want to blame the akratic simply on the basis of her 
judgment/intention mismatch, without having to scrutinize her specific motivational abilities? 
Well, yes and no. On the one hand, externalism can grant this by ascribing (to most people at 
least) a motivation to avoid akrasia (after all, there seem to be real harms in being internally 
conflicted). Such a motivation would make them at least disposed to act in accordance with 
normative judgment, and would justify our expectation that they do so. On the other hand, it 
does seem hasty (and somewhat insensitive to individuals’ circumstances) automatically to 
assume that, just because you made a certain judgment, you must now or later be able to 
follow through on it, and to therefore proceed with blaming you if you do not follow through. 
For one last time, compare the case with promises: even as a receiver of your promise, I 
should grant that it might not be entirely in your power to be able to keep the promise. Given 
that it makes no a priori assumption about what normative judgment motivationally involves, 
 15 
externalism is well placed to recommend ‘double-checking’ before blaming someone for 
their akrasia.  
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